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Abstract:  
The so-called buffer time or buffer delay allows airlines to control for excessive delays by 
introducing extra time in their schedule in addition to what is technically required. . We study 
the differences between unregulated markets - where airlines are free to fix their buffer times 
strategically - and a situation where a social planner would control for time schedules, and in 
particular the buffer time. To do so, we use a calibrated model of a network of three cities - one 
of them being a hub - served by a single airline. Welfare losses that follow from delays are 
relatively small as compared to the potential benefits that would follow from a decrease in ticket 
prices. The model thus advocates that, at least for the connections that are considered, fares 
rather than delays should be the focus of institutions aiming at enhancing passengers’ welfare. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The permanent delays that plague air traffic question the economist about the possible reasons 
for this apparent market failure. Leaving aside the traditional explanation – namely congestion – 
this paper is aimed at explaining how the transportation system as a whole copes with 
exogenous events that result in delays on single flights. As we show below, neither the 
minimum travel time, nor the difference between the realized and scheduled arrival times are 
actually of any help to assess the social cost of delays. This cost is to be measured in reference 
to a socially optimal schedule, which does not reduce the travel time to its minimum, nor 
necessarily wash out any delay. While the socially optimal schedule should in general differ 
from the one corresponding to profit maximization, we evidence that, at least on the network we 
consider, the resulting cost is small as compared to the benefits that would follow a decrease in 
fares. 
During the last decades, airports have regularly experienced delays. According to the 
Central Office for Delays Analysis about 40 percent of European flights have been delayed by 
at least 5 minutes between 2003 and 2010. During that same period, according to the Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics, more than 20 percent of flights landed with at least 15 minutes delays 
in the US. These figures decreased over the last years as a result of the 2008-2009 economic 
crisis, during which the total number of flights went down by 6.6 percent, after years with a 
growth rate of about 3.5 percent. However, the observed delays remain high and, since January 
2010, passenger traffic is again growing in all regions of the globe. This growth is expected to 
continue: Airbus forecasts a yearly traffic growth of 4.7 percent for the period 2013-2033; 
Boeing’s forecast, although slightly smaller still amounts to 4.1 percent, meaning that traffic is 
expected to double in less than 17 years.
1
 Delays are thus unlikely to disappear any soon. 
There are essentially two channels that should be acted upon in order to reduce delays. 
First, an increase in airport and air traffic management capacity could be needed, at least to cope 
with the traffic growth. Second, congestion charges should be introduced for an efficient use of 
existing capacities. For both action channels, an estimation of the costs of delays is of primary 
importance. 
Although the estimates may differ substantially, the impact of delays over the economy is 
unanimously considered as significant. In the U.S., the Joint Economic Committee (2008) 
evaluated the cost of delays (for both airlines and passengers) at $ 31 billion for 2007, while the 
Air Transport Association (2013) estimated it to amount to $ 7 billion for 2012. In 1996, as a 
                                                 
1
Sources: Airbus, 2014 and Boeing, 2014. 
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consequence, the Federal Aviation Administration created the National Center of Excellence for 
Aviation Operators (NEXTOR), a university-industry-government partnership aimed at 
developing capabilities for modeling, designing and evaluating the performance and safety of 
partially decentralized, more flexible, advanced technology concepts for air traffic management 
and airports. In Europe, delays are estimated to cost airlines between €1.3 and €1.9 billion a 
year.
2
 To deal with this issue, the Commission is promoting the so-called Single European Sky 
and the Single European Sky ATM Research Program (SESAR), which is the European version 
of NEXTOR.
3
 SESAR also sustains the development of alternatives to air transportation, such 
as the High-Speed Rail System.
4
 Delays are considered to be such a burden that the Commission 
proposed specific measures to protect consumers. (See European Commission, 2001.) Since 
2005, monetary compensations are to be provided to passengers in case of denied boarding to 
all flights from the E.U. and/or with destination in the E.U. (See European Commission, 2005.) 
It is also the case for ―long delays.‖ Moreover, the E.U. Court of Justice ruled on 19th 
November 2009 that when the delay is longer than three hours, compensations may be payable 
as if the flight was cancelled.
 5
 
Delays are usually considered to be the direct product of congestion, which in turn is 
considered to be, at least in part, a consequence of externalities attached to air traffic. As a 
matter of fact, an airline has no incentive to account for the burden its flights’ schedule may 
impose on others operations. Congestion charges may help inducing firms to ―internalize‖ the 
above mentioned externalities and they are broadly accepted as key to achieve efficiency in 
congested airports and reduce overall delays. See, among others, Levine (1969), Carlin and Park 
(1970), Park (1971) or Morrison et al. (1989). Obviously, the higher its market share, the larger 
the proportion of externalities internalized by an airline, thus the smaller the optimal congestion 
charges. Daniel (1995) was the first to study the internalization of congestion at hub airports. 
Brueckner (2002; 2005) shows that congestion is fully internalized at airports dominated by a 
monopolist. Similar results are obtained by Pels and Verhoef (2004), Janic and Stough (2006), 
Zhang and Zhang (2006) or Ater (2012). However, empirical evidence is weak as suggested by 
Morrison and Winston (2007) or Rupp (2009). Moreover, congestion pricing involves several 
issues. First, as suggested by Schank (2005), it is hard to implement it effectively. Second, 
given the lack of competitors (at least on many European routes) and the barrier for new airlines 
to enter at least in most of European hubs, linking congestion fees and market power in the 
                                                 
2
 On http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air/single_european_sky/single_european_sky_en.htm,  
3
 See http://www.sesarju.eu/ 
4
 See http://ec.europa.eu/transport/rail/interoperability/high_speed_en.htm 
5
 Joined cases of Sturgeon v Condor Flugdienst GmbH and Bock and others v Air France SA C-402 and 
423/07 
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design of optimal taxation (i.e. charging more small operators) has undesirable (anti-
competitive) effects that may well outweigh expected benefits. 
A closer look at the actual management of airlines – more precisely flight scheduling and 
operation management – may however provide us with interesting insights on the issue of 
delays. Airlines can indeed leverage delays through different channels, but mainly through the 
so-called flight-time buffer, which is defined as the extra-time introduced in the schedule in 
addition to the minimum required travel time. Flight-time buffer is a very widespread practice, 
in particular among airlines whose network is organized around a hub.
6
 (See Lederer et 
Nambimadom, 1998; and Baumgarten et al. 2014.) It provides indeed a simple precautionary 
method to ensure that all passengers are able to get their connections in time. Flight-time buffer 
can yet turn out to be useful also for carriers that do not offer any connections, i.e., low cost 
airlines. In fact, by ―padding‖ the schedule, airlines are able to recover from delays more easily; 
they improve the predictability of rotations and their punctuality performance with respect to 
published schedules.  
Thus, this practice does not only reduce the costs to passengers, which usually consider less 
painful to have a longer journey than to endure unexpected delays; it also drives down airlines’ 
operational costs. However, most airlines do not choose a flight buffer time that leads to an 
average delay equal to zero. As pointed out in a report produced by Cook et al. (2004), an 
airline finds it worth adding minutes of flight-time buffer to the schedule only ―up to the point at 
which the cost of doing this equals the expected cost of the tactical delays they are designed to 
absorb.‖ 7 Clearly, the very fact that some type of ―delays‖ may be profitable to firms does not 
say anything about its social desirability. Here we nevertheless evidence that ―delays‖ can also 
benefit society, and in particular, positive flight-time buffer may also benefit travelers.  
Indeed, although delays are often considered as a totally undesirable phenomenon, they 
may however also entail some profits both for airlines and consumers. Mayer and Sinai (2003) 
already point out that delays cannot be explained by congestion externalities only. When delays 
are measured as the difference between actual travel time and minimum travel time, they 
observe that delays are not reduced to zero at the optimum. In their model, transport services are 
organized according to a hub-and-spoke system in which a single round-trip flight from (and to) 
the hub connected with N airports generates 2N different journeys. There are thus network 
benefits attached to clustering flights at the hub as it may allow more passengers to connect. 
                                                 
6
 It is a common practice of airlines operating at hubs in the U.S. to schedule longer flight times at the end 
of the day on a same market operated with the same aircraft. Some airlines also introduce more buffer 
time in the morning to avoid concatenating delays all over the day. In France, this practice is not allowed 
and airlines must choose a single scheduled time for all their flights on a given market operated with the 
same aircraft. 
7
  See  Cook et al. (2004). 
- 5 - 
 
Then, the authors provide evidence that longer ―delays‖ (waiting time) at the hubs are the 
efficient equilibrium outcome for an airline equating marginal (congestion) costs of an 
additional flight with its marginal (network) benefits.  
The very idea of social gains coming from congestion is also present in Betancor and 
Nombela (2002) who show that although it may generate delays, an increase in frequency of 
services can raise the welfare of travelers. Nombela et al. (2004) suggest that socially optimum 
flight-time buffer is likely to be strictly positive. This is to say that congestion or delays are not 
to be regarded as evidence of system distress.  
More generally, the assessment of any transportation system cannot spare an explicit 
reference to social optimum. Some delays might be desirable, even from the travelers’ point of 
view. Therefore, when attempting to estimate ―social costs of delays,‖ it is economically 
restrictive to consider the sole observed delays and give them a monetary value by coining a 
value of time. This is the approach taken until now in the literature, which is not profuse while 
there is a profuse literature of value of time (See for instance Shires and Jong, 2009.). Indeed, 
few studies have been devoted to the estimation of the costs of delays in air transportation. The 
research undertaken by Nombela et al. (2002) and the reports by the Institut du Transport 
Aérien (ITA 2000), Ball et al. (2010) and by Cook et al. (2004) are the main references. Their 
results are summarized in Table 1 in the Appendix.
8
 These three reports consider observed 
delays and flight-time buffers for the estimation of cost. In all cases, however, the estimated 
values of airline and passenger costs depend heavily upon the value of time estimates that are 
taken from previous works and are relatively heterogeneous.  
It is manifest that, when estimating the inefficiencies streaming from delays, one should not 
consider the difference between realized travel time and minimum travel time. For society, the 
real costs of delays stream from the difference between actual travel time and optimum travel 
time, namely the expected travel time when flight-time buffers are set to their (socially) 
optimum level. The social cost of ―delays‖ (observed and buffer) is therefore the loss in welfare 
that follows from a socially non optimal scheduling decided by the firm. And the sole ―delay‖ 
for which the firm can be unequivocally rebuked is the difference between the scheduled flight-
time buffer and the optimal one. This is at least the approach adopted in our model and, more 
generally, the view we advocate. 
Characterizing the optimal policy and providing a guideline for its implementation would 
be a very challenging exercise in a real context. Given its complexity (and the potential costs 
attached to it), we rather choose to assess the potential benefits of such a policy through a 
                                                 
8
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sensible simulation.
9
 The results of our calibration exercise suggest that, in the considered case, 
(i) Optimal flight-time buffers are smaller than actual flight-time buffers (i.e., travelers would 
prefer to have shorter journeys, even at a cost of more delays) and (ii) the welfare losses that 
follow from sub-optimal scheduling are relatively small as compared to the potential benefits 
that would follow from other regulatory efforts such as a decrease in ticket prices. However, 
these results are tied to the features of the particular network we study here. 
To sum up, this paper aims at making precise the real issues at stake when facing the 
problem of delays in air-transportation. It also provides a methodology in order to estimate the 
social cost of delays. The latter is illustrated with a simple calibrated model. The paper is 
organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the notations of the model. Section 3 presents 
the firm’s and passengers’ problems and outlines how demand parameters can be recovered. 
The maximization of social welfare is discussed in section 3.3. In section 4, we describe the 
data for the market under scrutiny, namely the city pairs formed by Toulouse, Paris and Nice. 
Then using the calibrated demand parameters and these data, we apply the proposed 
methodology in section 5. The last section presents our conclusions. 
 
2. Notations and definitions for travel time 
 
 
Consider a direct flight between two cities i and j. The flow of passengers between these 
cities is denoted Xij. The travel time between cities i and j is affected by a stochastic delay ij
distributed according to some density function 
ij
f .  
Airlines control these delays announcing larger scheduled travel time than the minimum 
(and in most of the cases, average) observed travel time. The minimum technical time required 
to fly between the two cities is denoted, 
ij
 , and we denote as 
ij
  the flight-time buffer, i.e. the 
extra-time introduced in the schedule in addition to the minimum required travel time. The 
scheduled travel time is therefore the sum of the minimum required travel time, 
ij
 , and the 
flight-time buffer 
ij
 . Under this setting passengers suffer an apparent delay only if the 
stochastic delay is larger than the flight-time buffer, 
ij ij  , as shown in Figure 1. 
Passengers often use a connecting flight in order to reach their final destination. The flow of 
passengers between cities i and j flying by a hub is denoted Xihj with the index h referencing the 
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 Sensible in the sense that the simulated situation is based upon a reduced network but observed data in 
France. 
- 7 - 
 
hub. Under optimal conditions, passengers between i and j connecting at the hub h require some 
minutes to get their connection. Let 
ihj  represent the minimum time technically required to 
reach the departure gate after landing. Airlines could sell tickets with a connecting time equal to
ihj . However, missing a connection represents a high cost for passengers. In order to reduce 
this risk and similarly to the flight-time buffer introduced on direct flights, carriers schedule the 
connecting flights at a later time by introducing a connection buffer 0
ihj
  . The connecting 
time is thus 
ihj ihj  . Passengers are expected to arrive to the hub at time ih ih   and depart at 
time 
ih ih ihj ihj
      . If no connection buffer is introduced, any apparent delay on the first 
flight implies a missed connection. As airlines introduce connection buffer, the apparent delay 
must be higher than the buffer to miss the connecting flight. By doing so, carriers increase the 
expected travel time of connecting passengers. There is thus a first trade-off between the costs 
and benefits of the connection buffer, 
ihj
 . Observe that this trade-off regards connecting 
passengers only. Ater (2012) suggests that hub-carriers spread out their waves of arriving and 
departing flights to control for delays when their market share increases, and consequently 
impose longer connecting time for their passengers. 
Hence, as 
ihj  is strictly positive, the expected travel time is larger than the minimum 
possible time, which says that missing the plane is costly. We also know that even if buffer time 
is included, delays remain possible. The plane will arrive too late with a positive probability 
since increasing expected travel time is costly. Thus, when the realization of the stochastic delay 
exceeds the flight-time buffer and the connection buffer, 
ih ih ihj
    , airlines may consider 
delaying departure of the second flight by 
hj
  minutes to wait for connecting passengers. This is 
a real delay as opposed to 
ihj
 , i.e., scheduling later the departure. It benefits connecting 
passengers but creates a cost to all passengers of the flight departing from the hub. We define 
hj
  as the “held-flight” buffer. Thus passengers with an arrival delay, ih , smaller than 
ih ihj hj
     will not miss their connecting flight. We expect that 
hj ihj
   as marginal benefits 
from both buffers, passengers gaining their connection in case of small delays, are equal while 
the marginal costs of adding one minute of held-flight buffer 
hj
  is higher than the marginal cost 
of the connection buffer 
ihj
 . Likewise we can expect 0
hj
  , as missing the connection has a 
cost for both passengers and airlines. In other words, some diffusion of delays is to be observed. 
Note, however, that the later phenomenon is conditional on the delay being ―sufficiently large‖, 
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i.e., larger than the buffers, 
ih ih ihj
    , and yet, not ―too large‖ as the costs of delaying the 
flight must not overcome the gains for the connecting passengers. 
 
 
3. Model Specification 
 
3.1. The Passenger’s problem 
 
We assume that passenger’s demand is affected linearly by the price P and the expected 
travel time for any city pair. According to our definitions for flight time, connection and held-
flight buffers, three different expected travel times are possible according to the city of origin 
and destination. Hence there exist three types of demands corresponding to the three types of 
markets, each associated to one city pair:  
 Markets arriving to the hub h, with demand
ih
X ; 
 Markets departing from the hub with a demand
hj
X ; 
 Markets with a connection at the hub, with a demand
ihj
X . 
 
Markets arriving to the hub 
In the simplest case, i.e., flights arriving to the hub, the demand is expressed as follows: 
 
   ih ih ih ih ih ih ihX P Ed         , (1) 
  
where 0
ih
   and 0
ih
   are constant parameters specific to the routes. The parameter 0   is 
common to all routes and denotes the passengers’ value of expected travel time. The expected 
travel time is equal to the scheduled time,
ih ih
  , plus the average or expected delay, 
ih
Ed . 
Koster et al. (2013) show that the mean delay is a good proxy for the total expected passenger 
costs. 
Delays, as random events, pose higher costs for passengers than costs linked to scheduled 
travel time,  . Small (1993), Khattak (1995) or De Palma and Rochat (1996) estimate these 
cost of delays between 1.03 and 2.69 times the cost of scheduled travel time. We decompose the 
cost of delays as the product between the value of time  and a parameter   larger than 1. The 
demand is then rewritten as 
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     
ih
ih ih ih ih ih ih ih ihX P f d
        
        
 
, (2) 
 
Under this specification, delays represent a linear cost even though passengers penalize 
more severely long than short delays. There are several possibilities to introduce a nonlinear 
approach in the valuation of time.
10
 We follow Mahmassani and Chang (1987), who propose a 
―band of indifference‖ so that passengers do not punish carriers for small delays. Travelers 
suffer a cost,  , only if delays are superior to a significant threshold,  , such that: 
 
     
ih
ih ih ih ih ih ih ih ihX P f d 
         


         
 
, (3) 
 
Markets departing from the hub 
Passengers flying from the hub, h, to a spoke, j, also benefit from a direct flight. However 
their expected travel time is subject to a higher uncertainty. If the realized delay attached to 
flights from i to h exceeds the flight-time and connection buffers, that is, if  ih ih ihj    , the 
carrier may introduce a held-flight buffer, 
hj , allowing connecting passengers to get their 
connection. This decision is based on the aggregated distribution of delays from flights arriving 
at the hub with connecting passengers.  
The expected travel time for passengers flying from the hub is increased by the expected 
held-flight buffer introduced by the airline. Their demand is specified as: 
 
    ,hj hj hj hj hj hj hjX P Ed           (4) 
 
where 
hjEd  represents the expected delay for the flight between h and j and is given by 
 
     
       
0
ih ihj hj
ih ihj hj ih ihj ih
ih ihj
hj
ih ihj hj
hj ih ih ihj hj hj hj hj ih ih hj ih
ih ih ih ih ih ih hj hj hj hj hj
Ed f f d d
f d f f d f d
  
      
 
 
  
         
        
  
    
 


 
      
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
(5)
 
 
 
Markets with a connection at the hub 
                                                 
10
 See, for instance, Carrion and Levinson (2012) for a review on value of time reliability.  
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Finally, connecting passengers flying from i to j through the hub face the longest and most 
complex journey. They risk suffering a delay at the end of their trip, 
hj
 . However, their total 
travel time is mainly determined by the delays observed at their first flight, 
ih
 . If the latter are 
small, their journey equals the minimum travel time required for the trip. If instead they are 
between 
ih ihj
   and 
ihj hjih
    , the airline introduces a held-flight buffer, 
hj ih ih ihj
      , 
to ensure the connection. If delays 
ih
  are bigger than 
ih ihj hj     passengers lose their 
connecting flight and wait for the next scheduled flight. This implies an extra waiting time that 
we denote
ihj
 . The airline gives a compensation 
lf
C  to each passenger losing his/her 
connection. Thus, the demand is obtained as: 
 
     1ihj ihj ihj ihj lf ih ih ihj ih ih ihj ihj hj hj ihjhjX P C F Ed                       (6) 
 
where 
 
     
          
0
1
ih ihj hj
ih ihj hj ih ihj ih
ih ihj
hj
ih ihj hj
ihj ih ih ihj hj hj hj hj ih ih hj ih
ih ih ih ih ih ih hj hj hj hj hj ihj ih ih ihj hj
Ed f d d
f d f d f d F
  
      
 
 
  
          
            
  
    
 


 
      
 
       
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
3.2. The Airline’s Problem 
 
We assume that an airline in a monopolistic position is serving all markets, which is a 
common case within regional markets. In particular, despite the liberalization process in air 
transportation, there is still a low level of competition on European markets as suggested by 
Billette de Villemeur (2004) or Neven et al.(2006). The airline offers direct flights between any 
city i and the hub h and offers indirect services from i to j through h. Therefore the three types 
of demand presented in the previous section correspond to three types of markets, each 
associated with one city pair:  
The cost to convey Xih passengers from city i to the hub h is assumed to obey the following 
functional form: 
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      max ,0 ,ih ih ih ih ih ih ihC X a c bX C C           (7) 
  
where a, c and b are strictly positive parameters, 
ih
  represents the minimum travel time 
between the cities, 
ih
  is the flight-time buffer and
 
C
  
is the cost linked to adding one minute of 
flight-time buffer, which is expected to be smaller than the cost for a minute of observed delay 
C  .  
Observe that airlines face a tradeoff since increasing buffer time (and its cost C

 ) reduces 
the observed delays (and their cost  max , 0
ih
C

  ). These delays are distributed according to 
a cumulative distribution  
ij
F  . The delay distribution is considered to be (exogenously) 
given. In particular, like the optimal network they do not depend upon (the pattern of) flows. In 
this sense, the model does not consider congestion issues or network optimality. 
The firm maximizes the expected total profit by choosing the prices, the flight-time buffer, 
the connection buffer and the held-flight buffer. The profit is a function of the length of delays. 
If  ih ih ihj    , connecting passengers catch their flights. The firm does not need to introduce 
held-flight buffer and profits are at their maximum level, 
 
    
   
   
, , , , , , | ( )
( ( ))
( ( ))
ih
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C

 represents the cost per minute for the airline of suffering a delay. It is assumed to be the 
same for all flights, but our results remain unchanged if we assume different values for each 
route/plane. Let C

 represent the opportunity cost for airlines, i.e., the cost airlines support by 
choosing how long planes stay at airports and how much time they fly. When an airline raises 
the connection buffer at the hub, it also drives down the number of plane rotations; therefore the 
plane spends more time on the ground than in the air, and consequently costs per day decrease. 
If the airline reduces the connection buffer, the plane spends less time at the hub and increases 
its rotations in a day so that total costs rise. 
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Notice that under this setting, considering prices for round trip tickets instead of one way 
tickets would not affect Equation (8). The number of passengers in each market is on average 
the same for any direction, i.e.; the flow of passengers between Madrid and Paris is equal to the 
flow between Paris and Madrid, say. However, prices may be different for passengers buying a 
roundtrip from Paris to Madrid rather than from Madrid to Paris. We would therefore still 
require different prices for different markets. 
If  ih ih ihj     the airline can introduce a held-flight buffer equal to ih ih ihj     at a 
cost per minute of C

, or passengers flying from i to j lose their connecting flight and the carrier 
pays a penalty 
lf
C  per passenger due to the new regulation on delays.  ihih ihj C     is 
subtracted from (8) in the first case and 
ihjlfC X  in the second one. 
Hence total expected profit results from the addition of the three possible cases, i.e., small 
delays, delays requiring to wait for connecting passengers and large delays with passengers 
missing their connections, and we obtain: 
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The firm maximizes profit choosing , , , , ,  
ih hj ihj ih hj ihj
P P P    and
hj . At equilibrium, the profit 
maximizing conditions together with the demand equations must be satisfied. From this system 
of equations we can recover all unknown parameters ( , ,
ih ih
  , ,
hj hj
  ,
ihj
 ,
ihj
 , , , )C C
 
  .  
 
3.3. Welfare 
 
Our aim is to evaluate the difference between optimal social welfare and welfare at 
equilibrium. Welfare results from the addition of passengers’ surplus and airline’s profits. 
Passengers’ surplus can be recovered once the parameters of the demand have been calibrated. 
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Indeed the representative passenger is assumed to maximize his net utility given by 
ij ij ij ij ij
U P X Et X  , where 
ij
U  is the gross utility that consumers obtain from travelling and 
ij
Et  is the expected travel time. To maximize its net utility, the condition 
( )
ij ij ij ij
U X P Et P     must be satisfied, where ijP  is the generalized price. Once we calibrate 
the parameters of demand, the gross utility obtained by the passengers can be recovered by 
integrating the generalized price, ijP  over ijX , namely: 
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 (10) 
 
where each demand 
ij
X  responds to Equations (3), (4) and (6). 
We compute the connection, flight-time and held-flight buffers ( * * *,  ,  
ihj ih hj
    and 
*
hj
 ,) 
maximizing social welfare: 
 
 , , ,
[ Costs for passengers + Profits of the Firm]ih hj ihj
ih hj ihj hj
Max U U U
   
    (11) 
 
Definition: The difference between welfare evaluated at * * *,  ,  
ihj ih hj
    and 
*
hj
  and welfare 
at equilibrium represents the social cost of delays. 
 
Of course, the exact value of social cost of delays depends on the underlying market 
conditions. Market conditions will determine the chosen prices according to the imposed 
* * *
,  ,  
ihj ih hj
    and 
*
hj
 .  
 
 
4. Data    
 
Our model is validated in a network composed of the city-pairs Toulouse-Paris (i,h), Paris-
Nice (h,j) and Toulouse-Nice (i,h,j), where Paris operates as a hub. Data are available for all 
flights in the network during May and June of 2004. At the time Toulouse –Paris was the 5th 
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busiest city pair in Europe and Paris – Nice the 9th. Data for frequencies of flights, number of 
passengers, capacity and scheduled travel time are summarized in Table 2 for each direct route 
of the main airline. Although one competitor was present on the routes Toulouse-Paris and 
Paris-Nice, the degree of competition was low since it only offered 4 daily flights on each route 
(compared with the 23 and 20 flights offered by the incumbent) transporting 14.8 percent and 
16.3 percent of daily passengers respectively.  
On average 5 percent of passengers arriving to Paris from Toulouse and Nice took another 
plane to get to their final destination. We assume that connecting passengers on Paris-Nice 
represent 5 percent of the total passengers on this route since the airline’s decision about the 
connection and held-flight buffers is made as a function of the total number of connecting 
passengers in the studied market. 
Table 3 presents the unknown parameters and the values used in our calibration some of 
which are detailed in this section. We had information on more than 100 listed prices for 
different kinds of consumers under different conditions, yet we do not observe the final choice 
of consumers and the percentages of business and leisure travelers remain unknown. It is 
therefore impossible to compute the average price paid by a representative consumer. However 
our robustness analysis, in Section 5.1, shows that prices have minor effects over the calibration 
of demand, and do not affect the optimal buffer and extra time so that the gain in welfare 
remains unaffected.  
Arrival delays on each route, 
ij
 , are assumed to be distributed according to a gamma 
distribution. Its scale and shape parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood. Although the 
airline’s decisions are determined according to the aggregated distribution of delays from all 
flights arriving at the hub, we assume that this aggregated distribution of arrivals is equal to the 
distribution of the single flight arriving at the hub that we are considering. Delays are stochastic. 
Nevertheless, as stated previously, they can be controlled introducing a flight-time buffer for the 
schedule and a held-flight buffer at the tactical level. Table 4 presents the average delays for our 
markets. Although most delays occur when the load of planes is higher than the average (peak 
traffic), long delays occur at flights with lower load than the average delayed flight. This 
implies that airlines have more control over delays than just flight-time buffer as we assume in 
our model.  
The cost of adding a held-flight buffer minute, C , is available from different studies as 
shows Table 1. Estimations by Nombela et al. (2002) and Cook et al. (2004; 2011) include costs 
due to lost market share and lost corporate image. These costs are captured in our model by the 
very dependence of the passengers’ demand on the expected travel time. Therefore we 
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considered a lower range of values proposed by ITA (2000), between 35.5 and 50.9 €/min.11 
The same range of values is considered for C . As the airline mostly operates the same airplane 
model, we assume that b and C  are the same for all routes. We consider low values for b, 
between 0.005€ and 0.03€, since b measures the variable cost per passenger and minute on a 
given flight, i.e., the costs per kilometer derived from the increase in gasoline consumption from 
an additional passenger.  
Finally, lfC  is the hard cost for the airline of a passenger losing his/her connection, that is to 
say compensations and rebooking. We are assuming that at the studied period these costs were 
zero. In section 5.1 we study the effect on social welfare of the inclusion of compensations as 
proposed by the E.U. Commission.  
 
5. Results 
 
The proposed values for the calibration exercise as well as the calibrated parameters are 
presented in Table 5. The absolute values of the price elasticities are larger than 1 as expected, 
given the monopoly assumption: 1.02 for Toulouse-Paris, 1.02 for Paris-Nice and 1.03 for 
Toulouse-Paris-Nice.  
The cost of delays resulting from the product of the ratio   and the value of buffer time   
remains pretty stable with values comprised between 0.85 and 0.95 Euros per minute (51-57 
Euros per hour) even if we apply significant changes to any parameter in the calibration 
exercise. This can be considered as high when compared to the values proposed in the studies 
compiled in Table 1.  However, the rapport prepared by the Commissariat Général à la Stratégie 
et à la Prospective (Quinet, 2013) presents values between 52 and 72 Euros for air transport 
according to the travel purposes for short delays (less than 10 minutes) on an unspecified 
distance within France .  
It is interesting to notice the role of non-linearities in the cost of delays on the calibration. 
The ratio   increases with the threshold fixed for significant delays (obtaining always values 
superior to 1 from a threshold larger than or equal 5 minutes of delay). This sustains the 
hypothesis that the cost of delays is not linear and increases with the size of the delay.  
                                                 
11
 Nonetheless, given the thorough information provided by Cook et al. (2004) we can also compute the 
cost for the studied route considering only at-gate and taxi delay costs of the airplanes used in the routes. 
We obtain an average cost of 15.7 Euros per minute. This value implies a lower estimated value of time at 
the calibration of demand, but it does not imply any change on the optimal choice of buffer and extra 
delays. 
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With respect to buffer time,  , our value of 0.69 euros per minute (41.4 euros per hour) is 
as expected lower than the cost of delays. The study by Cook et al. (2004) proposes a value 
between 0 and 16.3 euros per flight-time buffer minute for airlines. However the study states 
that ―these are fairly rudimentary estimates.‖ Besides, it takes into account only the airline’s 
costs while we consider the overall effects over airlines and passengers. The study by ITA 
(2000) assumes that the passengers cost of flight-time buffer is equal to the cost of delays which 
seems to be far from reality. It also assumes that airlines’ cost for flight-time buffer is even 
slightly bigger than the cost of delays, which makes unreasonable the existence of the flight-
time buffer. We could also compare this value with the proposed values of time in the literature, 
for instance Bickel et al. (2006) proposed values between 16 and 38€ for France suggestions: , 
―and Quinet 2013 values between 52 and 72‖.  
Given the calibrated demands, we can calculate the flight-time buffer, connection buffer and 
held-flight buffer that maximize social welfare: * 12.91
ihj
  , 
* 0hj  , 
*
11.75
ih
   and 
*
9.67
hj
  minutes. Whatever the changes applied to the parameters used in the study, at the 
optimal solution all buffers decrease. At the social optimum, passengers enjoy a smaller average 
travel time and face a higher probability of suffering delays and thus more chance of losing their 
connection. The held-flight buffer disappears at the optimum due to the high cost of introducing 
held-flight buffer for the carrier and due also to some factors characterizing our markets such as 
the low probability of losing a connection, the low extra waiting time or the low number of 
connecting passengers that would profit from this buffer compared to the number of passengers 
who would suffer its consequences. If some of these factors are attenuated we find optimal 
solutions where the held-flight buffer is again larger than zero while it remains always lower 
than the value at equilibrium 
If these values are imposed on the airline, the gain in welfare for society represents only a 
1.43 percent increase with respect to the welfare observed at equilibrium. Under this optimal 
solution, demand increases in the three considered routes even if prices increase. For Paris-
Toulouse-Nice the demand increases by 7 percent while the price increases by 6.8 percent. 
Toulouse-Paris’ passengers increase by 4.5 percent coupled with a price increase of 4.4 percent. 
Finally we observe an increase of 3 percent in the demand for Paris-nice and 2.9 percent 
increase in the price.  
 
5.1. Sensitivity analysis 
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The effects on demand calibration and optimal welfare of a measurement error or a 
variation are negligible for most of the parameters. For instance, changes in the minimum time 
required for passengers to connect, ,ihj or changes in the variable cost per passenger, b , have 
insignificant effects over the calibration of demand and the optimal social choice. Other 
parameters such as C , have more relevant effects. From the conditions that must be satisfied at 
equilibrium we know that changes in the cost of the held-flight buffer affect proportionally the 
introduction of the held-flight buffer by airlines. This affects also the gain in welfare when we 
compel the optimal levels of *
ihj
  and 
*
hj
 which, however, do not suffer any significant variation. 
Other variables require a more detailed analysis.  
Changes in Prices: The selection of prices has a small effect over the calibration of 
demand, and does not affect the optimal flight-time buffer, connection buffer and held-flight 
buffer so that the gain in welfare remains unaffected. In particular, if price were 25 percent 
lower only parameters   and   are modified on each demand, but no change is observed on 
the cost of delays and the optimal schedule choices. Still, this price reduction has important 
effects over the absolute level of welfare since it affects the consumers’ surplus. With the actual 
setting, welfare increases almost by 13 percent. Instead, decreasing flight-time buffer by more 
than a half increases welfare only by 1.4 percent (the same effect can be obtained with a 2.5 
percent price reduction). Therefore, effects of changes in prices over welfare are of first order 
magnitude while changes of flight-time buffer produce a second order effect over welfare.  
Introduction of delay compensations lfC : At equilibrium delay compensations were set 
equal to zero. We analyze the effects of introducing compensations for passengers losing their 
connections given the low probability of suffering long delays on the studied markets. Any 
compensation leads to higher prices for connecting passengers and a decrease on welfare. Only 
very high compensations affect the buffer choices, increasing especially the minutes of buffer at 
the connecting airport. Still, the effects remain minor for small compensations. Although the 
airline could also decide to increase the flight-time buffer for the second segment of the flight 
(Paris-Nice), it would have to compensate all the direct passengers with a price reduction. If we 
calibrate the highest compensation for delays proposed by the European Commission for a 
market with less than 1500 km, which attains 250€, welfare diminishes by 3.8 percent, more 
than double the possible gain from imposing optimal delays. 
Changes over the number of connecting passengers: Ceteris paribus, for a higher number 
of connecting passengers, we expect to find a smaller cost of delays and therefore a smaller gain 
in welfare. In fact, for a similar connection buffer and a higher number of connecting passengers 
(which implies that direct flight passengers have decreased), the probability of passengers 
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loosing connections rests unchanged while their weight over the market increases. Therefore, 
the cost of delays is less important than in the case where connecting passengers are fewer. Vice 
versa, if we believe that the number of connecting passengers was smaller than what we 
assumed, we would expect a higher cost of delays. 
Cost of delays estimations are sensible to changes in the number of connecting passengers, 
especially when we decrease it. By contrast, the optimal flight-time buffer and held-flight buffer 
remain almost unaltered. If we decrease the number of connecting passengers by 20 percent, we 
observe that the cost of delays increases to 1.09€/ minute (an increase of 27 percent). 
Conversely when we increase this value by the same proportion, the cost of delays decreases to 
0.26€/minute (-19 percent) and the gain in welfare to 6.15€ (-10 percent). If we keep increasing 
the number of connecting passengers the cost of delays decreases. Still, almost no effect is 
observed over optimal buffer times and gains in welfare. Also, a reduction (or an increase) in 
the number of connecting passengers is accompanied by a reduction (or increase) in the minutes 
of held-flight buffer introduced to wait for connecting passengers, which implies an opposite 
effect over the calibration of buffer time. 
Changes in the distribution of exogenous delays: Changes on the distribution of delays 
have minor effects both over the calibration and the optimal choices. Exogenous changes due to 
shocks or changes in security laws have also small effects over welfare with respect to the 
reduction or increase of delays for this particular network. The effect could instead be 
significant if it implied the entry of new competitors on congested airports. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Travel  time delays constitute a widespread phenomenon in air-transportation. This paper is 
a first-attempt to make precise the issues at stake in order to draw a consistent policy. It also 
provides a methodology to estimate the social costs of delays. The latter is illustrated by the 
means of a simple calibration.  
We consider a single, profit-maximizing operator. Complex pricing schemes do not come as 
an issue since we adopt a representative agent approach. All passengers have the same value of 
time and, for each city-pair, demand is derived from quasi-linear preferences as represented by 
quadratic utilities.  
With this simple yet (in our view) realistic model, we obtain very clear-cut results from a 
calibration exercise performed with exhaustive data over a two-month period. Airlines should 
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decrease their flight-time buffer. That is to say, a socially optimal schedule would result in 
shorter journeys but more apparent delays.  
The effects over welfare of these changes, however appear to be small. There are several 
reasons for this. First, the low number of connecting passengers over the sample and the high 
frequency of services. Second and more importantly, scheduling is only one dimension of the 
analysis. As long as pricing is not subject to any constraint, firms are able to extract a fair 
amount of consumer (gross) surplus. Thus, because an increase in consumer surplus ultimately 
leads to an increase in their profits, airlines account for traveler benefits while taking their 
scheduling decisions. This is to say: the only difference between profit-maximizing and socially 
optimal scheduling stem from pricing imperfections.  
While free scheduling yields very little inefficiency from a social welfare point of view, 
clearly, the other side of the coin is that profit-maximizing pricing is likely to be very harmful, 
absent competition. If public intervention is to be considered, this is the place. 
Overall and in any case, the proposed E.U. policy on compensation for long delays appears 
either to be ineffective or to result in reduced social welfare.  
This paper has several limitations. First, as a consequence of the representative agent 
approach, travelers have an identical value of time. It follows that market segmentation is 
exogenous. Would consumers have had heterogeneous characteristics, optimal choice theory 
would have indeed provided a natural endogenous split of travelers across available services. 
Second, passengers are risk neutral. This is obviously a point to take into account and we plan to 
look at the consequences of risk aversion in the near future. Observe, however, that the latter 
can only change numerical estimates. All conclusions drawn here are robust to the introduction 
of risk aversion as they do not hinge upon the particular values attached to time losses. They 
directly follow from the economic mechanisms at hand. 
Second, the model assumes that the distribution of delays is exogenous and therefore it 
proposes only two tools to control the level of  congestion: 
 the extra delays that are included on the second flight due to the delay on the first 
flight 
 the proposed values for the cost of adding a held-flight buffer minute, C , include 
congestion costs 
Wiping off this assumption would probably enhance the results and provide lesser impact of 
the optimal policy: with congestion the increase of delays implied by the optimum will be 
reached with a lower increase of traffic, and the difference between the optimal solution and the 
monopolist solution will be smaller than without congestion  
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Finally, some may point to the monopoly assumption as being quite restrictive. Yet, 
according to Tournut (2004), 60 percent of the routes in the world are operated through a 
monopolistic position. And, according to Billette de Villemeur (2004), the figure raises to 85 
percent for the routes over the French territory. Obviously, optimal delays (hence costs) depend 
upon the market situation. Thus, whenever competition occurs (within the air-transportation 
mode or across transportation modes), it has to be taken into account in order to derive 
consistent empirical estimates. That said, we are rather confident that our main conclusions 
would persist with such an enrichment of our model.  
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Appendix: Figures and Tables 
Figures 
Figure 1: Flight-time buffer and distribution of delays 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of delays affecting connecting passengers 
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1: Summary on Studies of Costs of Air Traffic Delays for Europe 
 ITA (2000) 
Nombela et 
al. (2002) 
Ball et al. 
(2010) 
Cook et al. (2004)  
Market and time coverage Europe 1999 
Madrid airport 
July 1997-
2000 
United States 
2007 
Europe 2004 
Kind of delays 
Schedule and 
Buffer 
Schedule 
Schedule and 
Buffer 
Schedule and 
Buffer* 
Estimated costs  
Airlines 
39.4 - 48.6 €/ 
min  
83.3 €/ min $4.6 billion 72 €/ min 
Passengers 
0.57 – 0.73 
€/min 
0.26 €/ min $0.63/min  
*Flight-time buffer are estimated in a theoretical way but not included on the final estimation of costs. 
 
 
Table 2: Average data May –June 2004 
Direct Flights Toulouse-Paris  Paris-Nice 
Total passengers  177414 166831 
Total number of flights 1432 1228 
Average Passengers per 
flight 
123.9 135.9 
Travel time (minutes) 80 85 
Frequencies
 a
 23.5 20.1 
Airplane
 b
 A320 A320 
Capacity
 c
 161.9 168.1 
Average occupation 76.5% 80.8% 
a
 Average frequency of flights per day; 
b
 Most frequent plane; 
c
 Average capacity of the planes 
operated on the route. 
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Table 3: Results from the calibrated demands  
Values proposed for the calibration Unknown parameters 
ihX  118.47 hj  0.81 ih  
hjX  130.52 C  40 ih  
ihjX  5.34 C  40 hj  
ihP  80 b  0.02 hj  
hjP  95 ihj  20 ihj  
ihjP  120 ihj  25.04 ihj  
ih  55 ihj  20   
ih  25 ihj  40 C  
hj  64 lfC  0 C  
hj  21   1.25  
  10    
 
 
 
 
      Table 4: Average Delays for flights and passengers 
 At Departure At Arrival 
Flights 
29.3% 
4.4 min 
16.4% 
2.9 min 
Flights with  
delay > 15 min 
7.7% 
35.3 min 
6.3% 
36.4 min 
Passengers 
31.9% 
5.1 min 
18.6% 
3.3 min 
Passengers with  
delay > 15 min 
8.4% 
36.2 min 
7% 
36.4 min  
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Table 5: Results from the calibrated demands  
 
Values proposed for the 
calibration 
Results 
Values maximizing social welfare 
ihX  118.47 hj  0.81 ih  323.35 ihX  123.80 hj  0 
hjX  130.52 C  40 ih  -1.50 hjX  134.43 C  40 
ihjX  5.34 C  40 hj  346.60 ihjX  5.72 C  40 
ihP  80 b  0.02 hj  -1.39 ihP  83.52 b  0.02 
hjP  95 ihj  20 ihj  17.46 hjP  97.75 ihj  20 
ihjP  120 ihj  25.04 ihj  -0.05 ihjP  128.16 ihj  12.99 
ih  55 ihj  20   0.69 ih  55 ihj  20 
ih  25 ihj  40 C  -3.19 ih  11.75 ihj  40 
hj  64 lfC  0 C  -65.13 hj  64 lfC  0 
hj  21   1.25 Cost of delays  
 =0.8625 
hj  9.67   1.25 
  10     10   
Welfare 36154€  Welfare 37031€ 
 
